

**TOP SECRET**

*file 602*

*orig to Mr. Chance  
2/5/64*

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**TOP SECRET**

3 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)  
SUBJECT: Revision of Checklist and Bulletin

1. Your conversations with the DCI, Mr. Bundy, and General Clifton last month have opened the way for a much simpler solution to the problems in daily reporting with which we have been wrestling. By handling the creation of a new high-level daily through a broader circulation of the Checklist, we can divorce this issue from the question of over-broad dissemination of sensitive intelligence. This in turn will make possible some changes in the CIB and DIS which, I believe, will restrict dissemination enough to satisfy State and DDP without forcing DIA to lower the content of the DIS. We should thus avoid a nasty fight.

2. The scheme we would propose has the following elements:

a. Expansion of Checklist dissemination enough to include all the President's key national security policy advisors.

b. Production of the President's Review as a by-product of the Checklist. ✓

c. No substantial change in the CIB itself.

d. Agreement by DIA to

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1) Withhold certain sensitive cables (specifically the State "Limdis" series and DDP's [redacted] series) from the electrical dissemination of the DIS.

2) Halt dissemination of the hard-copy version of the DIS outside Washington.

3) Reduce CIB and DIS dissemination in the DOD.

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**e. Agreement by CIA to**

1) Withhold the same reports series from the electrical dissemination of the CIB.

2) Reduce CIB and DIS dissemination in CIA.

**f. Establishment of an ad hoc committee to coordinate d.3) and e.2) above, to develop a coordinated government-wide plan for dissemination of "non-sensitive" current intelligence, and to put it into effect.**

**g. Presentation to USIB of an agreed CIB working group report which incorporates d, e, and f above as recommendations, but which does not deal with the Checklist.**

**h. Conversion of the Digest to a secret version of the CIB.**

**3. The steps required to put this package expeditiously into effect are:**

**a. Obtain the DCI's approval of the concept (already accomplished).**

**b. Obtain White House approval (already accomplished).**

**c. Obtain DDP's concurrence in our scheme for resolving the dissemination problem (already accomplished).**

**d. Obtain State's concurrence. (A draft talking paper for my use with Hughes is attached as Tab A).**

**e. Obtain DIA's concurrence. (A draft talking paper for your use with Carroll is attached as Tab B).**

**f. Reconvene the CIB Working Group to prepare a revised agreed report. (A draft is attached as Tab C).**

**g. Present this to USIB.**

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

HANDLE VIA COMINT CLASS

h. Put its recommendations into effect for the CIB.

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i. Convene the new working group on dissemination under [REDACTED]

j. Make internal arrangements for the expanded Checklist (A proposed scheme is attached as Tab D).

k. Inform the new, and present, Checklist recipients what we are doing.

l. After the rest of the exercise is complete, attack the Digest-Secret CIB problem.

/s/

R. J. SMITH  
Assistant Director  
Current Intelligence

Attachments: a/s

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

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1 - Mr. Bross

1 - AD/CI

1 - Pres([REDACTED])

1 - ASP/CI

1 - CIB file

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ASP/CI [REDACTED] yd/7424(3 Feb 64)

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TAB A

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Talking Paper for use with Hughes

1. The working group report has surfaced a serious problem and something needs to be done about it. However, the more we think about bringing a split paper of this sort before USIB the less we like it. We have therefore been looking for some other way to solve the problem.
2. At the same time events have overtaken us. The death of JFK has changed the character of the Checklist and made it possible for us to increase its circulation slightly. By so doing we can use it as our high-level daily, albeit a somewhat more informal one than we had planned. (We would propose to add Messrs. Ball, Harriman, Johnson, (Rostow?) and yourself in State; Vance, Bill Bundy, and Carroll in DOD; Robert Kennedy and Dillon).
3. Since we can do this unilaterally, we would then leave the CIB unchanged in content and instead undertake a set of limitations on its circulation and that of the DIS. These would give sensitive State cables and our own clandestine service reports a greater degree of protection. We believe these could be so designed as to be acceptable to DIA and still accomplish our basic purpose.

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(Specifically, "Lindis" cables [REDACTED] would not be used in the cable versions of either publication and no hard copy DIS would be sent out of Washington.) DIA and CIA would also collaborate in reducing, perhaps by about 40 percent, the circulation of hard copy DIS and CIB. Since DIA would retain the right to use sensitive cables in its hard copy, which appears to be its real sticking point, it will probably go along. On the other hand, State will retain the veto on use of its own sensitive cables which it has now, as will DDP. We think this package, incorporated in the working group report in place of the present recommendations, will bring the main classes of sensitive information under control.

4. [Optional should coordination issue be raised.] We have considered the problems in coordinating the Checklist and concluded that it is unnecessary and in any case impractical. From State's point of view, because the Checklist is an informal and unilateral effort, INR needs to take no responsibility for its content. But, since the Checklist is based on the CIB and takes its line substantially from it, State will still have a considerable degree of influence on its content.

5. Furthermore, coordination is impractical. The Checklist has worked partly because of its style and partly

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because of its timeliness. We get the style from having one man--who can write--putting the CIB back into English after the analysts have finished squabbling with one another. We get the timeliness from holding off publication until the last possible moment at some (acceptable) cost to beauty of product. (When we have to, we go to press at 0850 for an 0900 deadline). It is simply not possible to coordinate a product at this hour--or really any hour after 1800 the previous evening--but we would welcome suggestions. It is also not possible for us to use the CIB system and make minimal changes after close of business. Aside from the problem of competition with DIA, the readers of the Checklist are not going to sit still for yesterday's news. If we cannot fill them in on the overnight take, we are not giving them any service they cannot get for themselves. On the other hand, most of the updating we do for the Checklist is factual; the analytic line is normally set by the CIB and thus is responsive to State's wishes. Finally, last but by no means least, while it is USIB's business what we do with the CIB, what we do with the Checklist is the business of Johnson and McCone; both of them are for it.

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TAB B

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Talking Paper for use with Carroll

1. We have been overtaken by events in the CIB exercise. Bundy and McCone have decided it would be better to add a few Checklist readers rather than create a new formal publication. This will take care of one of our objectives in the working group--providing all-source service to the inner circle of policy-makers.

2. The other aspect of the working group's report still has to be dealt with. We must provide some better control on sensitive intelligence than we now do or the producers will quite rightly cut us off. This control can be provided by some fairly rigid restrictions on the cabled version of the CIB and DIS and certain other steps. Our proposition is to eliminate sensitive State and CIA cables (specifically the "Lindis" [REDACTED] series) entirely from the cables of both publications, and to drop the hard copy circulation of the DIS out of Washington. (Note to RSC: we could give some of this. DIA sends 20 out of town of which 6 go overseas, only the latter are actually illegal. We used to send 4 CIB's out of town, of which 2 went overseas, but have cut them all out so

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we would be in a stronger position). We would then undertake to make a radical cut in DIS and CIB circulation in CIA, and DIA would undertake a similar cut in the DOD.

3. These restrictions we think would satisfy State and DDP while leaving DIA free to use their sensitive reports in its primary publication. As to the Checklist, we would plan to make Mr. Vance a regular reader and add Bill Bundy. Should we add anyone else?

4. If DIA agrees, we would alter the working group report to reflect the arrangements listed above, without mentioning the Checklist, and present an agreed report.